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Abstract—In physical layer security (PHY-security), the fre-
quently observed high correlation between the main and wiretap
channels can cause a significant loss of secrecy. This paper
investigates a slow fading scenario, where a transmitter (Alice)
sends a confidential message to a legitimate receiver (Bob) while a
passive eavesdropper (Eve) attempts to decode the message from
its received signal. It is assumed that Alice is equipped with
multiple antennas while Bob and Eve each have a single antenna
(i.e., a MISOSE system). In a MISOSE system, high correlation
results in nearly collinear main and wiretap channel vectors,
which help Eve to see and intercept confidential information.
Unfortunately, the signal processing techniques at Alice, such as
beamforming and artificial noise (AN), are helpless, especially
in the extreme case of completely collinear main and wiretap
channel vectors. On this background, we first investigate the
achievable secrecy outage probability via beamforming and AN at
Alice with the optimal power allocation between the information-
bearing signal and AN. Then, an ingenious model, in which a
cooperative jamming relay (Relay) is introduced, is proposed
to effectively mitigate the adverse effects of high correlation.
Based on the proposed model, the power allocation between the
information-bearing signal at Alice and the AN at Relay is also
studied to maximize secrecy. Finally, to validate our proposed
schemes, numerical simulations are conducted, and the results
show that a significant performance gain with respect to secrecy
is achieved.
Index Terms—PHY-security, nearly collinear, jamming relay,
secrecy outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the approach of the so-called big data era, ex-pansive wireless communication networks as critical
data contributors [1] have naturally given rise to growing
uneasiness about data security. Wireless communication is
particularly vulnerable to eavesdropping and impersonation
attacks due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation. Tradi-
tional security approaches employ symmetric and asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms to achieve communication confiden-
tiality and authentication, respectively [2]. Recently, PHY-
security techniques have attracted considerable attention as
an alternative to the traditional high-complexity cryptography-
based secrecy methods.
PHY-security has some obvious advantages compared to
cryptography-based secrecy methods implemented at the upper
layers. For instance, with the rapid advancement of computing
Sai Xu, Shuai Han and Weixiao Meng are with the Communications
Research Center, Harbin Institute of Technology, China. (e-mail: fenicexu-
sai@163.com; hanshuai@hit.edu.cn; wxmeng@hit.edu.cn).
Cheng Li is with The Faculty of Engineering, Memorial University of
Newfoundland, St. John’s, Canada. (e-mail: licheng@mun.ca).
Manuscript received XX XX, XXXX; revised XX XX, XXXX.
technologies, Eve may use infinite computing capabilities to
launch brute force attacks or analytical attacks [3], which
can be disastrous for any cryptosystem. By contrast, in PHY-
security, the inherent randomness of wireless channels is
exploited to guarantee message confidentiality with proper
coding and signal processing, which can allow the confidential
message to be decoded by only Bob.
In the last several decades, researchers have developed
a significant number of mathematical theories, technologies,
algorithms, and solutions for addressing PHY-security chal-
lenges, and the solution varies for each scenario. Almost all the
explored signal processing techniques promoting PHY-security
aim to increase the signal quality difference at Bob and Eve
[4], and good security performance has been achieved in
scenarios where the CSI (channel state information) between
the main and eavesdropper channels is independent or weakly
correlated. By contrast, scenarios exist where the main and
eavesdropper channels are highly correlated, and correlation
largely depends on the antenna deployment, the proximity
of Bob and Eve, and the scatter around them [5]–[7]. For
example, antenna deployment at high altitude in rural or
suburban areas generates dominant line-of-sight paths, which
results in high correlation between the received signals at
the two receivers. Moreover, it is also possible that Eve
actively induces correlation, for example, by approaching Bob.
Owing to the correlation, the security performance may suffer
significant loss. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge,
few relevant strategies exist and how to strengthen secrecy
remains an open issue under adverse conditions. Therefore,
we are motivated to develop relevant strategies to strengthen
secrecy under conditions of high correlation.
A. Related Work
The existing literature on PHY-security focus on indepen-
dent or weakly correlated wiretap channel models; thus, the
involved schemes are not directly applied to the new scenario
where the main and wiretap channels are highly correlated.
Nevertheless, the related techniques may still be applicable by
redesigning the model.
In PHY-security, beamforming and precoding techniques at
Alice can enhance the signal quality at Bob while limiting
the signal strength at Eve. In addition, AN inserted into
the transmitted signal can degrade the reception at Eve and
consequently further increase the signal quality difference
at Bob and Eve. [2] briefly classifies these techniques into
four categories, namely, covering beamforming, ZF precoding,
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2convex (CVX)-based precoding, and AN precoding. However,
when the main and eavesdropper channels are highly corre-
lated, the signal processing techniques at Alice appear to be
powerless.
Another common technique to improve confidential trans-
mission is relay systems, which can provide additional spatial
degrees of freedom through the antennas at the relays. In PHY-
security, relays are usually employed to forward data to Bob
or to emit AN or jamming signals to disrupt reception at
Eve [8]–[15]. Moreover, relay systems can use full duplex
to improve secrecy [16]–[18]. However, these schemes focus
on independent or weakly correlated wiretap channel models
where channel correlation is not considered.
On the other hand, several works address high correlation.
[19] propose that secrecy can be enhanced by opportunistically
transmitting messages in time slots instead of using exces-
sively large signal power. In particular, confidential transmis-
sion occurs when the main channel has better instantaneous
channel gain than that of the eavesdropper channel. To max-
imize the secrecy, power is allocated through a water-filling
strategy in the time domain, which states that more power is
transmitted in time slots when the channel exhibits high SNR
and less power is sent in time slots with poor SNR. Obviously,
[19] does not eliminate the fundamental problem caused by
high correlation by improving only the usage efficiency of the
transmitted power. Additionally, for delay-limited applications,
the encoding over multiple channel states adopted in [19] may
not be acceptable since it may incur long delays [14].
B. Scope of Work
In this paper, we study strategies to improve secrecy in re-
sponse to pressure from high correlation between the main and
eavesdropper channels and propose a scheme using a jamming
relay to strengthen the secrecy. This work distinguishes itself
from existing literature in following aspects:
(1) Traditional beamforming and AN techniques at Alice
are exploited to enhance secrecy in a slowly fading Rayleigh
environment where the main and wiretap channels are assumed
to be highly correlated. Furthermore, the transmitted power
allocation between the information-bearing signal and AN
at Alice is investigated to further reduce the secrecy outage
probability. According to the analysis, high correlation gives
rise to significant loss of secrecy, and traditional beamforming
and AN at Alice have limited ability to lower the adverse
effects of high correlation.
(2) To overcome the secrecy performance degradation due
to high correlation, a cooperative jamming relay is introduced
into the system to create new conditions for confidential
transmission. By employing the cooperative jamming relay to
emit AN to disrupt reception at Eve, the difference at Bob
and Eve is increased, consequently improving the secrecy
performance. This strategy depends on only instantaneous
characteristic channel gain, which does not incur long delays.
(3) The joint power allocation between the information-
bearing signal at Alice and AN at Relay is presented to further
enhance the confidentiality of the system. For this purpose,
we propose and discuss the optimal power allocation ratio
Alice ...
Eve
Bob
hAE
hAB
Fig. 1: System model.
between Alice and Relay. Based on the results, the secrecy
outage probability in the proposed scheme with a cooperative
jamming relay is computed and simulated. Compared to the
traditional scheme, low secrecy outage probability is ensured.
C. Outline of the Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section
II presents the system model with high correlation between
the main and wiretap channels; in section III, traditional
beamforming and AN at Alice are exploited to enhance
secrecy under high correlation, and the transmitted power
allocation between the information-bearing signal and AN at
Alice is investigated to lower the secrecy outage probability; in
section IV, we propose a scheme that introduces a cooperative
jamming relay into the system to create new conditions for
confidential transmission, which is followed by joint power
allocation between the information-bearing signal at Alice and
AN at Relay; section V presents simulations whose numerical
results demonstrate that the proposed schemes provide signif-
icant performance gain when the main and wiretap channels
are highly correlated; section VI provides the conclusions of
this work.
Throughout this paper, the following notation will be used:
Boldface upper and lower cases denote matrices and vectors,
respectively. [·]H denotes the conjugate transpose operation.
The notation E[·] denotes the mathematical expectation. |·|
denotes the norm of a vector.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider the wireless scenario
where Alice sends a confidential message to Bob while the
transmission is overheard by only one passive Eve. It is
assumed that Alice is equipped with M antennas while Bob
and Eve each have a single antenna. Since Eve passively
receives the transmitted signal from Alice, Alice can only
obtain the CSI of the Alice-Bob link when the CSI of the
Alice-Eve link is not known. However, it is reasonable to
assume that the statistical CSI of the Alice-Eve link is available
to Alice since these statistics can be obtained from prior
measurements of the environment. Here, we directly assume
that the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links are slowly fading
Rayleigh channels. Note that the secrecy of communications
is not dependent on the secrecy of channel gain; therefore, all
the channel gains can be published.
When Alice transmits a data stream bearing useful infor-
mation, the signals received at Bob and Eve are written,
respectively, as
3yB = h
H
ABx+ nB (1)
and
yE = h
H
AEx+ nE , (2)
where x ∈ CM×1 is the transmitted signal vector from Alice
and E{|x|2} ≤ P represents the total power of the transmitted
signal from Alice. hAB and hAE denote the channel gain
vectors from Alice to Bob and from Alice to Eve, respec-
tively, with hAB ∼ CN (0, σABI) and hAE ∼ CN (0, σAEI)
assumed. nB and nE denote the additive noise at Bob and
Eve, respectively, with nB ∼ CN (0, 1) and nE ∼ CN (0, 1)
assumed. It is worth noting that the path loss related to
the distance is modeled as position-dependent channel gain
variance, whereas the power of the additive noise is normalized
for simplification.
In a certain regional scope of a wireless environment,
wireless channels between different users may be associated
with each other, the extent of which often depends on the
distance between users and the scatter around them. In our
model,to intercept more confidential information, Eve may
actively approach Bob to increase the correlation between hAB
and hAE . The reason is that the distance from Alice to Bob
and Eve is far larger than that between Bob and Eve, which
may result in a similar signal path. Due to the high correlation,
the difference between the main and wiretap channels is very
small. We use the correlation coefficient between hAB and
hAE (denoted by ρ) to measure the degree of correlation
between the main and wiretap channels. In particular, ρ can
be expressed as follows,
ρ =
hAB · hAE
|hAB | |hAE | , (3)
where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, with ρ = 0 indicating that hAB and hAE are
completely uncorrelated and ρ = 1 representing full correlation
in a time slot. On the other hand, since the entries of hAB and
hAE are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and
drawn from a complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean,
|hAB |2 and |hAE |2 both follow Gamma distributions with
parameters (2M,σAB/
√
2) and (2M,σAE/
√
2), respectively.
Since wireless environments often change very slowly, it
is reasonable to assume that the correlation between hAB and
hAE can be estimated through multiple prior measurements of
the environment and feedback coming from other users. Here,
we assume that ρ can be attained by a series of processes,
whereas the values of |hAB | and |hAE | are unknown and
independent of each other. It is worth emphasizing that ρ
represents the relationship between two “spatial” vectors, in
contrast to the usual relationship between “temporal” signal
vectors.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE UNDER HIGH CORRELATION
In a MISOSE system, beamforming at Alice is employed
as a common PHY-security technique to enhance the signal
quality at Bob while limiting the signal strength at Eve. By
contrast, AN techniques can be used to degrade the reception
at Eve to increase the signal quality difference at Bob and
Eve. In general, when Eve’s CSI is unknown, the information-
bearing signal can only be directed towards Bob, and AN can
effectively facilitate secrecy [4]. In this section, we discuss
how these techniques affect the secrecy performance under
the system model described above.
Under the system model described above, Alice simulta-
neously transmits an information-bearing signal and AN to
improve the secrecy performance. When AN is added to the
null space of hAB , the transmitted signal vector x can be
modified as follows,
x=
√
φP fu+
√
1− φ
M − 1PaA, (4)
where u ∼ CN (0, 1) corresponds to symbols in a Gaussian
codebook; f represents a beamformer; the transmitted signal
is directed at Bob with f = hAB/ |hAB| (this beamformer
design maximizes the average secrecy capacity when Eve’s
CSI is unknown to Alice [20]); aA denotes AN embedded
into the transmitted signal with aA ∼ CN (0, I); the ratios of
power allocated to the information-bearing signal and the AN
are denoted as φ and 1 − φ, respectively; and the remaining
symbols have the same or similar meaning as before.
Since Eve’s CSI is unknown, the AN is chosen within the
null space of hAB to prevent AN leakage into main channel,
such that hHABaA = 0. By contrast, some components of the
AN may lie in the range space of the Alice-Eve link, which
disrupts the reception at Eve with high probability. Therefore,
the received signals at Bob and Eve are rewritten, respectively,
as
yB =
√
φPhHABfu+ nB , (5)
and
yE =
√
φPhHAEfu+
√
1− φ
M − 1Ph
H
AEaA + nE . (6)
Since hAE is not known to Alice, a fixed aA may result
in a case where
∣∣hHAEaA∣∣2 is small; thereby, the power of
AN seen by Eve is also small. To reduce or avoid this
possibility, it may be better to randomly choose aA as a
complex Gaussian vector in the null space of hAB [20]. In
particular, aA can be generated through aA = ZABvA, where
ZAB is an orthonormal basis for the null space of hAB with
ZHABZAB = I, and the M-1 entries of vA are i.i.d. values
drawn from a complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and unit variance. Obviously, the power of the AN signal is
equally distributed in the null space of hAB .
A. Secrecy Performance
The SNRs at Bob and Eve are rewritten, respectively, as
SNRB = φP |hAB |2, (7)
and
4SNRE =
φP
∣∣∣hAEHf ∣∣∣2
1 +
1− φ
M − 1P |hAE
HaA|2
. (8)
Since the power of the AN signal is equally distributed in the
null space of hAB , by considering the correlation coefficient
ρ, Eq. 8 can be rewritten as
SNRE =
φρ2P |hAE |2
1 +
1− φ
M − 1(1− ρ
2)P |hAE |2
. (9)
Thus, the capacity of the main channel is given by
Cm = log(1 + SNRB)
= log(1 + φP |hAB |2),
(10)
and that of the wiretap channel is
Cw = log(1 + SNRE)
= log(1 +
φρ2P |hAE |2
1 +
1− φ
M − 1(1− ρ
2)P |hAE |2
). (11)
Based on Eq. 10 and Eq. 11, the secrecy capacity over a block
consisting of a large number of symbols can be obtained as
Cs =[Cm − Cw]+
= max{Cm − Cw, 0}.
(12)
In our proposed model, the secrecy outage probability and
outage capacity are considered when ideal interleaving is
impossible due to strict delay restrictions, and the channel ca-
pacity cannot be expressed as the average of the capacities for
all possible channel realizations (ergodic secrecy capacities).
We characterize the outage probability as follows,
Pout(Rs) = P{Cs < Rs}, (13)
i.e. the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity is
less than the target secrecy rate Rs. In addition, Rs is the
highest secrecy transmission rate that maintains the secrecy
outage probability under the given Pout, i.e., the outage
capacity subject to Pout. According to Eqs. 10 - 12, the outage
probability can be rewritten as
Pout(Rs) = P{SNRB − 2RsSNRE − 2Rs + 1 < 0}, (14)
where SNRB and SNRE are given in Eq. 7 and Eq. 9, re-
spectively. Further, given a target secrecy rate Rs, the secrecy
outage probability is obtained via Monte Carlo simulations.
B. Optimal Power Allocation
Based on the derivation of Pout, it is not difficult to see
that the ratios of the power allocation φ and hAB are key
factors in the secrecy outage probability and outage capacity.
In the following, we optimize the transmitted power allocation
according to the instantaneous realization of hAB and the
statistical distribution of hAE , aiming to minimize the secrecy
outage probability under a target secrecy rate Rs. Mathemat-
ically, the problem can be expressed as
max {Cm − E[Cw]}
s.t. E{|x|2} ≤ P,
0 ≤ φ ≤ 1,
(15)
where E[Cw] is the expectation of the wiretap capacity over
hAE , i.e.,
E[Cw] = EhAE{log(1 +
φρ2P |hAE |2
1 +
1− φ
M − 1(1− ρ
2)P |hAE |2
)}
= EhAE{log(
1 + [
1− φ
M − 1(1− ρ
2) + φρ2]P |hAE |2
1 +
1− φ
M − 1(1− ρ
2)P |hAE |2
)}
∆
= Cw1 − Cw2,
(16)
where
Cw1 = EhAE{log(1 + [
1− φ
M − 1(1− ρ
2) + φρ2]P |hAE |2)},
(17)
and
Cw2 = EhAE{log(1 +
1− φ
M − 1(1− ρ
2)P |hAE |2)}, (18)
where |hAE |2 follows a Gamma distribution whose probability
density function (PDF) satisfies
f(x) =
1
σAE2
1
Γ(M)
(
x
σAE2
)M−1e
−
x
σAE2 . (19)
Based on Eqs. 19 - 21, Cw1 and Cw2 are given, respectively,
by
Cw1 =
1
ln 2
exp(
1
[
1− φ
M − 1(1− ρ
2) + φρ2]σAE2P
)·
M∑
n=1
En(
1
[
1− φ
M − 1(1− ρ
2) + φρ2]σAE2P
)
(20)
and
Cw2 =
1
ln 2
exp(
1
1− φ
M − 1(1− ρ
2)σAE2P
)·
M∑
n=1
En(
1
1− φ
M − 1(1− ρ
2)σAE2P
).
(21)
It is worth noting that Eq. 20 and Eq. 21 are obtained using
the formula given in [22], i.e.,
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Fig. 2: The expectation of the wiretap capacity over hAE
versus the ratio of power allocation.
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + αx)
xN−1
Γ(N)ex
dx =
1
ln 2
exp(
1
α
)
N∑
n=1
En(
1
α
),
(22)
where is the exponential integral of the order defined by
En(
1
α
) =
∫ +∞
1
t−ne−
t
α dt,
1
α
≥ 0. (23)
According to Eqs. 20 and 21, the expectation of the wiretap
capacity over hAE , i.e., E[Cw], can be computed for any value
of the ratio of power allocation φ.
Fig. 2 shows that the result curve obtained through Monte
Carlo simulation perfectly agrees with that obtained via the
aforementioned method using the integral of exponential order,
confirming the accuracy of the two methods. It is worth noting
that the method using the integral of exponential order has
lower computational complexity than that of the Monte Carlo
simulation. Therefore, the former is appropriate for the case
where derivation can be achieved, whereas the latter can be
applied in the opposite case of high computational complexity.
Based on these results, the maximum instantaneous secrecy
capacity can be achieved by selecting the optimal φ. Then,
the secrecy outage probability Pout can be obtained via Monte
Carlo simulation.
IV. IMPROVING SECRECY USING A JAMMING RELAY
In many wireless situations, the difference between hAB
and hAE is exploited to achieve a positive secrecy rate, even
if the superiority of the main channel is not guaranteed.
In this process, signal processing techniques, including pre-
coding/beamforming and AN, are often employed. Precod-
ing/beamforming techniques can enhance the signal quality at
Bob while limiting the signal strength at Eve. AN techniques
can degrade the reception at Eve, thereby increasing the
signal quality difference at Bob and Eve. However, if the
difference between hAB and hAE is small, the loss of secrecy
capacity due to correlation is increased. In this case, the
Alice ...
Eve
Bob
Relay ...
hAE
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hRE
hRB
Fig. 3: Improving secrecy by introducing a jamming relay.
excessively large signal power does not help to improve the
secrecy capacity [19], and the usual schemes appear to be
powerless. To overcome this disadvantage, we propose an
ingeniously designed scheme where a cooperative jamming
relay is introduced into the system to create new conditions
for confidential transmission, as shown in Fig 3.
When Relay transmits signals that are independent of the
intended message, these signals create interference for both
Bob and Eve, limiting both of their decoding capabilities and
reducing their reliable decoding rates. However, the net effect
of this jamming may be an increase in the difference of the
rates and hence an increase in the achievable secrecy rate of the
Alice-Bob link. In other words, if an independent transmission
jams Bob and Eve simultaneously, Bob may experience a net
gain.
In our proposed scheme, Relay is equipped with N antennas.
In general, the Relay-Bob and Relay-Eve links (denoted by
hRB and hRE , respectively) are uncorrelated due to a rea-
sonable deployment of Relay. In many wireless environments,
it is reasonable to assume that the Relay-Bob and Relay-Eve
links are slowly fading Rayleigh channels. To enhance the
confidentiality, Relay emits AN to disrupt the reception at
Eve. Since hRB and hRE are uncorrelated, signal processing
techniques, including precoding/beamforming and AN, are
applicable to this new scenario. Although Eve could attempt to
mitigate the interference signal from Relay using a directional
antenna, hAE can be significantly changed accordingly to
amplify the difference between hAB and hAE . In this case, the
difficulty caused by the high correlation between the received
signals at Bob and Eve disappears; therefore, the case is not
considered.
We assume that Relay has the CSI of the Relay-Bob link
and that the statistical CSI of the Relay-Eve link is available
to Relay. Similar to the use of AN at Alice in Section III,
Relay transmits AN in the null space of the Relay-Bob link
with hRBHaR = 0, and some components of AN may lie in
the range space of the Relay-Eve link. The received signals
at Bob and Eve, jointly considering the signal containing a
confidential message from Alice and AN from Relay, are
written, respectively, as
yB =
√
λPhAB
Hfu+ nB , (24)
and
6yE =
√
λPhAE
Hfu+
√
1− λ
N − 1PhRE
HaR + nE , (25)
where aR denotes the AN vector in the null space of hRB
with aR ∼ CN (0, N − 1); λ represents the fraction of power
allocated to Alice; and the rest of the symbols have the
same or similar meaning as before. Note that in the model,
Alice only transmits the information-bearing signal without
AN, i.e., x = fu, because 1) the distance between Relay
and Eve is far less than that between Alice and Eve, which
results in lower power consumption over the travel path; 2) the
correlation between hRB and hRE is small, which guarantees
high jamming efficiency; and 3) the equipment complexity at
Alice is reduced significantly.
A. Secrecy Performance
The SNRs at Bob and Eve are rewritten, respectively, as
SNRB = λP |hAB |2, (26)
and
SNRE =
λρ2P |hAE |2
1 +
1− λ
N − 1P |hRE · aR|
2
=
λρ2P |hAE |2
1 +
1− λ
N − 1(1− ρ
2
R)P |hRE |2
,
(27)
where
ρR =
hRE · hRB
|hRE | |hRB | . (28)
Thus, the capacity of the main channel is given by
Cm = log(1 + λP |hAB |2), (29)
and that of the wiretap channel is
Cw = log(1 +
λρ2P |hAE |2
1 +
1− λ
N − 1(1− ρ
2
R)P |hRE |2
). (30)
On this basis, we can obtain the secrecy capacity over a
block consisting of a large number of symbols and the outage
probability according to Eq. 12 and Eq. 14, respectively.
B. Joint Power Allocation of Alice and Relay
When the level of the correlation between the main and
wiretap channels is very high, the secrecy performance of the
system suffers significant loss. In view of this situation, we
present a scheme to introduce a cooperative jamming relay.
Although the relay generates a new dimension to overcome the
secrecy performance degradation caused by high correlation,
it is obvious that better power allocation between Alice and
Relay plays a essential role in guaranteeing a lower secrecy
outage probability. Thus, in this section, we focus on the joint
power allocation of Alice and Relay.
Similar to section III.B, in this scheme, the problem of
minimizing the secrecy outage probability under a target
secrecy rate Rs can be expressed as
max {Cm − E[Cw]}
s.t. E{|x|2} ≤ P,
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
(31)
where E[Cw] is the expectation of the wiretap capacity over
hAE and hRE , i.e.,
E[Cw] = EhAE ,hRE{log(1 +
λρ2P |hAE |2
1 +
1− λ
N − 1(1− ρ
2
R)P |hRE |2
).
(32)
The expectation of the wiretap capacity in Eq. 32, i.e.,
E[Cw], can be obtained via Monte Carlo simulations for any
power allocation ratio φ. Based on these results, the maximum
instantaneous secrecy capacity can be achieved by choosing
the optimal φ. Then, the secrecy outage probability Pout can
be obtained using Monte Carlo simulations.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, computer simulations are performed to eval-
uate the performance of our proposed scheme of introducing
a cooperative jamming relay. We start by investigating how
the square of the correlation coefficient between the main and
wiretap channels affects the secrecy outage probability; the
traditional scheme employing beamforming and AN at Alice is
presented for comparison. Then, we present the secrecy outage
probability with respect to the total transmitted power. Lastly,
the secrecy outage probability versus the target secrecy rate
Rs or outage capacity is given.
A. Pout versus ρ2
Here, we discuss the relationship between the secrecy
outage probability and the correlation coefficient. Some of
the parameters in the simulations are set as follows: the total
transmitted power P is 3 dBW; the target secrecy rate Rs is 0
bps/Hz since we do not focus on a specified communication
in practice; the additive noise at Bob and Eve is assumed
to be i.i.d. drawn from a complex Gaussian distribution with
zero mean and unit variance; the variances of hAB and hAE ,
which are related to the path loss depending on distance, are
both σ2AB = σ
2
AE = 1/2 because Bob and Eve are very close.
It is worth noting that owing to the normalized noise power
and P = P/σn, the total transmitted power can be measured
in ”dB”.
Fig. 4 plots the relationship between the secrecy outage
probability Pout and the square of the correlation coefficient
between the main and wiretap channels ρ2. Relay is generally
deployed closer to Bob than to Alice; therefore, the path
loss between Relay and Bob is lower than that from Alice
to Bob and can be modeled as σ2RB > σ
2
AB . However, to
exclude the benefit of the shorter distance between Relay and
Bob and to focus on the effects of introducing a cooperative
jamming relay, we intentionally set σ2RB = σ
2
AB to ensure
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Fig. 4: The relationship between the secrecy outage probability
Pout and the square of the correlation coefficient between the
main and wiretap channels ρ2.
an equivalent path loss. In addition, we set σ2RB = σ
2
RE
because Bob and Eve are very close. Fig. 4 presents three
cases, where the number of antennas at Alice M = 2, 4 and
8 and the number of antennas at Relay is N = 2 . Fig.
4 clearly shows that the secrecy outage probability depends
largely on ρ2. When ρ2 is very large, the secrecy outage
probability is also large. In the extreme case where hAB and
hAE are completely collinear, i.e., ρ2 = 1, the secrecy outage
probability is approximately 0.63 and only depends on |hAB |
and |hAE |. The secrecy outage probability is not 0.5 because
the optimal power allocation ratio between Alice and Relay is
selected based on the instantaneous secrecy capacity rather
than the secrecy outage probability. Our proposed scheme
using a cooperative jamming relay has a lower secrecy outage
probability than the traditional scheme without such a relay in
the high ρ2 regime for each case, which indicates that secrecy
loss due to high correlation can be significantly reduced by
using a cooperative jamming relay. However, the performance
gains of our proposed scheme in the low ρ2 regime are
not obvious, possibly because the secrecy capacity for our
proposed scheme is determined jointly by hAE and hRE and
only their statistical information is known. By contrast, the
secrecy capacity for the traditional scheme depends on only
the statistical information of hAE . On the other hand, as M
increases, the control of the secrecy outage probability can be
improve, which can be accounted for by the dependence of
the Gamma distribution on M.
Fig. 5 presents the secrecy outage probabilityPout versus
the square of the correlation coefficient between the main
and wiretap channels ρ2 with σ2RB = σ
2
RE = 1/2 and
σ2RB = σ
2
RE = 1, respectively. This simulation is conducted
to verify that the shorter distance between Relay and Bob
provides additional secrecy gains. Fig. 5 presents three cases,
where the number of antennas at Alice is M = 2, 4 and 8
and the number of antennas at Relay is N = 2. The secrecy
performance at larger σ2RB and σ
2
RE is better than that at
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Fig. 5: The secrecy outage probability Pout versus the square
of the correlation coefficient between the main and wiretap
channels ρ2 with σ2RB = σ
2
RE = 1/2 and σ
2
RB = σ
2
RE = 1,
respectively.
smaller σ2RB and σ
2
RE because larger σ
2
RB and σ
2
RE represent
a shorter distance and smaller path loss, which help to ensure
that power is used more effectively.
Fig. 6 shows the secrecy outage probability Pout with
respect to the square of the correlation coefficient between the
main and wiretap channels ρ2, where the number of antennas
Relay is N = 2, 4 and 8, and the number of antennas at Alice
is M = 8. Moreover, σ2RB = σ
2
RE = σ
2
RB = σ
2
RE = 1/2 to
remove the secrecy gains due to less path loss. It is obvious
that our proposed scheme using a cooperative jamming relay
has a much lower Pout than the traditional scheme in each
case (N = 2, 4 and 8). Compared to the cases of N = 2 and 4,
the value of Pout is the lowest, with the same ρ2, for N = 8,
which means more antennas at Relay improves the secrecy. On
the other hand, the attained secrecy gains via more antennas
equipped at Relay are more obvious at high ρ2 than that at
low ρ2.
B. Pout versus P
In this subsection, we discuss the relationship between the
secrecy outage probability and the total transmitted power.
Some of the parameters in the simulations are set as follows:
the target secrecy rate Rs is 0 bps/Hz; the additive noise at Bob
and Eve is i.i.d. drawn from a complex Gaussian distribution
with zero mean and unit variance; the variances of hAB , hAE ,
hRB and hRE are set to σ2RB = σ
2
RE = σ
2
RB = σ
2
RE = 1/2
to eliminate the secrecy gains due to less path loss.
Fig. 7 plots the relationship between the secrecy outage
probability Pout and the total transmitted power P (dB) in
for ρ2 = 0.9 and Rs = 0bps/Hz. Fig. 8 presents three cases,
where the number of antennas Alice M = 2, 4 and 8 while the
number of antennas at Relay is N = 2. High power plays an
important role in reducing Pout and facilitating secrecy, which
is consistent with our experience and knowledge. However,
in the traditional scheme, huge P is required to obtain low
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Fig. 6: The secrecy outage probability Pout with respect to
the square of the correlation coefficient between the main and
wiretap channels ρ2, where the number of antennas at Relay
is N = 2, 4 and 8, and the number of antennas at Alice is M
= 8.
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Fig. 7: The relationship between the secrecy outage probability
Pout and the total transmitted power P (dB) in the case of
ρ2 = 0.9 and Rs = 0bps/Hz.
Pout. By contrast, the utilization of P in our proposed scheme
with a cooperative jamming relay is more efficient, which
significantly decreases power consumption. In an extreme case
of ρ2 = 1, the secrecy outage probability in the traditional
scheme remains almost unchanged as P increases, and our
proposed scheme has a distinct advantage, as shown in the
Fig. 8. This result fully indicates that our proposed scheme of
introducing a cooperative jamming relay plays an irreplaceable
role in promoting secrecy at high ρ2.
Fig. 9 shows the secrecy outage probability Pout with
respect to the total transmitted power P (dB) in the case of
ρ2 = 0.9 and Rs = 0bps/Hz, where the number of antennas
Relay is N = 2, 4 and 8 and the number of antennas at Alice
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Fig. 8: The relationship between the secrecy outage probability
Pout and the total transmitted power P (dB) in the case of
ρ2 = 1 and Rs = 0bps/Hz.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
P(dB)
P o
u
t
 
 
without Relay
with Relay, N=2
with Relay, N=4
with Relay, N=8
Fig. 9: The secrecy outage probability Pout with respect to the
total transmitted power P (dB) in the case of ρ2 = 0.9 and
Rs = 0bps/Hz.
is M = 8. Our proposed scheme using a cooperative jamming
relay has a much lower Pout than that of the traditional scheme
in each case (N = 2, 4 and 8). Compared to the cases of N
= 2 and 4, the value of Pout is the lowest, with the same ρ2,
when N = 8, which means more antennas at Relay can help
to improve the secrecy.
C. Pout versus Rs
Here, we discuss the relationship between the secrecy
outage probability and the target secrecy rate Rs. Some of
the parameters in the simulations are set as follows: the total
transmitted power P is 3 dBW; the square of the correlation
coefficient between the main and wiretap channels is ρ2 = 0.9;
the additive noise at Bob and Eve is assumed to be i.i.d. drawn
from a complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit
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Fig. 10: The relationship between the secrecy outage probabil-
ity Pout and the target secrecy rate Rs in the case of ρ2 = 0.9
and P = 3dB.
variance; the variances of hAB , hAE , hRB and hRE are set
to σ2RB = σ
2
RE = σ
2
RB = σ
2
RE = 1/2 to eliminate the secrecy
gains due to path loss.
Fig. 10 plots the relationship between the secrecy outage
probability Pout and the target secrecy rate Rs in the case
of ρ2 = 0.9 and P = 3dB. Fig. 10 presents three cases,
where the number of antennas at Alice is M = 2, 4 and 8 and
the number of antennas at Relay is N = 2. We observe that
an increase in Rs can rapidly aggravate the growth of Pout,
which conforms to practical secrecy communications. When
Rs becomes very large, such as Rs = 1, Pout approaches 1,
which indicates that it is almost impossible to achieve secret
communications. By comparison, our proposed scheme using
a cooperative jamming relay has a lower Pout than that of the
traditional scheme in each case (M = 2, 4 and 8), especially
in the low Rs regime. However, when Rs is very large, both
our proposed scheme and the traditional scheme have a very
high Pout. By contrast, in the low Rs regime, compared to the
cases of M = 2 and 4, the value of Pout is the lowest, with
the same Rs, for M = 8. However, in the high Rs regime, an
increase in the number of antennas at Alice results in a high,
rather than low, Pout.
Fig. 11 shows the secrecy outage probability Pout with
respect to the target secrecy rate Rs in the case of ρ2 = 0.9
and P = 3dB, where the number of antennas at Relay is N
= 2, 4 and 8 and the number of antennas at Alice is M = 8.
Our proposed scheme using a cooperative jamming relay has a
much lower Pout than that of the traditional scheme, especially
in the low Rs regime. Three cases of N = 2, 4 and 8 are
considered in our proposed scheme. As shown in Fig. 11, the
Pout of the three cases in the same Rs is similar. Therefore, the
secrecy performance benefits little from additional antennas at
Relay, and only a small gain is achieved at low Rs.
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Fig. 11: The relationship between the secrecy outage probabil-
ity Pout and the target secrecy rate Rs in the case of ρ2 = 0.9
and P = 3dB.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated secrecy performance in
the situation where the main and wiretap channels are highly
correlated. Due to the high correlation, the secrecy suffers
significant loss, which is difficult to effectively mitigate by
employing signal processing techniques at Alice, such as pre-
coding/beamforming and AN. In response to this challenging
issue, we propose an ingenious scheme, in which a cooper-
ative jamming relay is introduced, to facilitate confidential
transmission. By reasonably deploying a cooperative jamming
relay, the links from the relay to the involved legitimate
receiver and eavesdropper can avoid high correlation. Then,
AN is embedded into the null space of the channel from
the relay to the legitimate receiver to degrade the reception
at the eavesdropper; in this case, AN has been shown to
be especially effective. The power allocation between the
information-bearing signal and AN is investigated to achieve
more efficient utilization of power and to maximize the se-
crecy. According to simulations, the traditional scheme of em-
ploying signal processing techniques at Alice suffers from high
correlation more than our proposed scheme. Moreover, adding
antennas at Alice and Relay facilitates secrecy at moderate
total transmitted power and target secrecy rate. These results
indicate that our ingeniously designed scheme of introducing
a cooperative jamming relay achieves significant performance
gain with respect to the secrecy outage probability. Note that
although the cooperative jamming relay helps to achieve better
secrecy, additional equipment is required and the complexity
of the system design is increased.
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